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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONSCIENTIOUS 
OBJECTION CLAUSES FOR PHARMACISTS 
Nancy K. Kubasek, Daniel C. Tagliarina & Corinne Staggs* 
INTRODUCTION 
What used to be a simple request is turning into a political 
firestorm.  Increasingly, women seeking to fill prescriptions for 
birth control pills and emergency contraception are being turned 
away from pharmacy counters across the country as a result of 
“conscientious objection laws,” also referred to as “conscience 
clauses” or “refusal clauses.” Such clauses allow pro-life 
pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions that are against the 
pharmacist’s individual religious or moral beliefs.1  While these 
clauses may appear to be benign clauses that simply give 
pharmacists the right to practice their profession in accordance 
with their conscience, conscientious objector clauses violate the  
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution and 
present a dangerous interference with the fundamental right to 
privacy established by Griswold v. Connecticut2 and its progeny.3 
                                                
 * Nancy K. Kubasek is a Professor of Legal Studies at Bowling Green State 
University. Daniel C. Tagliarina is a Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science at the 
University of Connecticut. Corinne Staggs is a Research Assistant for Professor 
Kubasek. 
1 The first reported refusal of a pharmacist to fill a prescription for an 
emergency contraceptive was in 1991. Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of 
Conscientious Objection—May Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for 
Emergency Contraception?, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2008, 2008 (2004). 
2 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
3 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (extending the right to protect 
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It is perhaps this interference with a woman’s right to privacy, 
which protects her right to use emergency contraception, to 
practice birth control, and to make important family planning 
decisions with the advice of her physician, that has stimulated the 
growing outcry against these laws. The strongest legal argument 
against these laws is that they violate the Establishment Clause of 
the United States Constitution. This article contends that 
conscientious objection statutes must be struck down as 
unconstitutional because such laws violate the Establishment 
Clause, or alternatively, that the statute must be narrowly drawn to 
provide only extremely limited circumstances under which the right 
to object can be exercised. 
Part I of this article examines conscientious objection laws 
often used by pharmacists who refuse to fill birth control and 
emergency contraception prescriptions. Part II delineates a 
historical backdrop to this issue and provides a background for 
understanding how the courts may examine this issue in the future. 
Part III examines why conscientious objection laws violate the 
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Part IV discusses the 
balance of interests between the woman’s right to privacy and the 
pharmacist’s interest in fulfilling his obligations without violating 
his conscience. Finally, the article concludes that the state may 
support a pharmacist’s right to refuse to fill lawfully prescribed 
prescriptions for birth control and emergency contraception only 
under the most limited of circumstances, and therefore most 
conscientious objection laws are unconstitutional. 
I. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION LAWS 
Many state legislatures have addressed the issue of 
conscientious objection in medical procedures relating to 
                                                
private sexual relations between consenting adults); Webster v. Reprod. Health 
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1998) (reaffirming the right); Carey v. Population Servs. 
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (affirming the right and extending it to minors); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973) (extending the right to protect a woman’s right 
to terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester, and under certain 
circumstances during the second and third trimesters); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 (1967) (extending the right to non-married couples). 
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reproductive choice.4 Historically, these conscientious objection 
laws have applied to abortion procedures5 and occasionally 
                                                
4 ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 
(2006); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-304 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 123420 (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-207 (2005); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 25-6-102 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (2006); FLA. STAT. 
§ 381.0051 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE § 18-612 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/4 
(2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (West 
2006); LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.31 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 
1903 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (West 2006); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
333.20181 (2006); MINN. STAT. § 145.414 (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-
107-5 (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-
111 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-338 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 632.475 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 30-5-2 (2006); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (2006); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741 
(2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225 (2006); 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 44-41-50 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104 (2005); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.002 
(Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
75 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.065 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 16-
2B-4 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 253.09 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 
(2006). 
5 ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 
(2006); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-304 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 123420 (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (2006); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-612 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 70/4 (2005); IND. CODE § 16-34-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (West 
2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.31 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (West 2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis 
Nexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20181 (2006); MINN. STAT. § 
145.414 (2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-
20-111 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-338 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
632.475 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); N.M. STAT. § 30-
5-2 (2006); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 14-45.1 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4731.91 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741 (2005); OR. REV. 
KUBASEK FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED .DOC 2/11/08  9:39 PM 
228 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
sterilization.6  More recently, these laws have been applied to 
pharmacists’ refusal to fill prescriptions for birth control.7 The 
various conscientious objection laws8 that have been enacted within 
                                                
STAT. § 435.485 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225 (2006); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 3213 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
44-41-50 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006); TEX. OCC. CODE 
ANN. § 103.002 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.065 (2006); WIS. 
STAT. § 253.09 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 (2006). 
6 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/4 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 
20-214 (West 2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104 (2005); WIS. STAT. § 253.09 (2006). 
7 See Karissa Eide, Can a Pharmacist Refuse to Fill Birth Control 
Prescriptions on Moral or Religious Grounds?, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 121, 
132–36 (2005) (describing the practice of pharmacists refusing to fill birth 
control prescriptions and arguing against this practice); see also Holly Teliska, 
Recent Development: Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses 
Undermine the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 229, 240–43 (2005) (arguing that allowing 
pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions is harmful to women). 
8 ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 
(2006); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-304 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 123420 (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-207 (2005); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 25-6-102 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (2006); FLA. STAT. 
§ 381.0051 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-612 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
70/4 (2005); IND. CODE § 16-34-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (West 2006); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.31 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 
1903 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (West 2006); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
333.20181 (2006); MINN. STAT. § 145.414 (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-
107-5 (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-
111 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-338 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.475 
(2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); N.M. STAT. § 30-5-2 
(2006); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
14-45.1 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4731.91 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 435.485 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225 (2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
3213 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50 
(2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-
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forty-six states can be categorized into four groups: (1) 
conscientious objection laws that do not apply to birth control;9 
(2) conscientious objection laws that could apply to birth control;10 
(3) statutes that apply to birth control but do not clearly apply to 
pharmacists;11 and (4) statutes that clearly apply to both birth 
control and pharmacists.12 
Conscientious objection laws which do not apply to birth 
control13 nevertheless adopt the same principle as laws that permit 
                                                
104 (2005); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.002 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2006); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 48.43.065 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-4 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 
253.09 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 (2006). 
9 ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 
(2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2006); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-612 (2006); IND. CODE § 16-
34-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (2006); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
40:1299.31 (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20181 (2006); MINN. STAT. § 145.414 (2005); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2005); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 28-338 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.475 (2006); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); N.M. STAT. § 30-5-2 (2006); N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (2006); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91 (West 
2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741 (2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213 
(2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50 
(2005); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.002 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 253.09 
(2006). 
10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (2006). 
11 COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-207 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-102 
(2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/4 (2005); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225 
(2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104 (2005); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-4 
(2006). 
12 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-304 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 381.0051 (2006); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.065 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 (2006). 
 13 ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2151 
(2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2006); HAW. REV. 
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pharmacists to refuse to fill a customer’s prescription—the idea 
that a person should not be forced to help another engage in 
conduct the person believes is wrong or immoral.14 Most of these 
                                                
STAT. § 453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-612 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-34-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 
(2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40:1299.31 (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20181 (2006); MINN. STAT. § 145.414 (2005); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2005); NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-338 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.475 (2006); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (2006); 
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 
(2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4731.91 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741 (2005); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 3213 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
44-41-50 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 
18.2-75 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 253.09 (2006). 
 14 The conscientious objection laws for abortion and sterilization that do not 
apply to birth control came first, and many of the laws that do apply to birth 
control seem to use similar language to the earlier statutes. Also, most of the 
states with laws that apply to birth control first had laws that applied to 
abortion. The 31 states that have conscientious objection laws that do not apply 
to birth control are Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 
(2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2151 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
123420 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
18-612 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 
(2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 
(West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.31 (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20181 (2006); 
MINN. STAT. § 145.414 (2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2006); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-338 (2005); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.475 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 
(West 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (2006); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-
I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
23-16-14 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91 (West 2006); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741 (2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213 (2005); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50 (2005); TEX. OCC. 
CODE ANN. § 103.002 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (2006); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 253.09 (2006). 
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laws allow physicians or any other person involved with an 
abortion procedure to refuse to participate without fear of legal or 
job-related consequences.15  As a precondition to refusing, such 
laws generally require the conscientious objector to have some 
legitimate reason for objecting.16 Acceptable reasons include some 
combination of moral, ethical, or religious conflict, or alternatively, 
personal reasons accompanied by the belief that it will cause the 
death of an unborn child.17 
                                                
 15 ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
123420 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
18-612 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 
(2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 
(West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.31 (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20181 (2006); 
MINN. STAT. § 145.414 (2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2006); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-338 (2005); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.475 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (2006); 
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 
(2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4731.91 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741 (2005); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 3213 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
44-41-50 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 
18.2-75 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 253.09 (2006). 
 16 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2151 (2006); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-304 
(2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2006); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 25-6-207 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-102 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 
381.0051 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
612 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/4 (2005); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 
§ 1903 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (West 2006); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5 
(2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 
(2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.475 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 
(2006); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
14-45.1 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225 
(2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 
(2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 
(2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
48.43.065 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-4 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 253.09 
(2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 (2006). 
 17 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (2006); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-
304 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2006); COLO. 
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The second category of statutes permit conscientious objection 
in circumstances involving the “termination of pregnancy” but do 
not include accompanying definitions of pregnancy.18  The absence 
of a legal definition of pregnancy permits objecting pharmacists to 
use to their advantage the ambiguity of what constitutes 
“termination of pregnancy.”  For example, despite the medical 
definition of pregnancy which occurs at implantation,19 if a 
pharmacist believes pregnancy occurs at fertilization, the use of 
birth control could be considered a termination of pregnancy.20 
                                                
REV. STAT. § 25-6-207 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-102 (2005); FLA. 
STAT. § 381.0051 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2006); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-612 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/4 (2005); IOWA CODE § 
146.1 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22, § 1903 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (West 
2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (LexisNexis 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 41-107-5 (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
50-20-111 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.475 (2006); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 30-5-2 (2006); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485 (2006); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 435.225 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104 (2005); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2006); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 48.43.065 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-4 (2006); WIS. STAT. 
§ 253.09 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 (2006). 
 18 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-
GEN. § 20-214 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485 (2006). 
19 BENJAMIN F. MILLER & CLAIRE BRACKMAN KEANE, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH 406 (7th ed. 
2003) (“Conception 1. The onset of pregnancy, marked by implantation of the 
blastocyst, the formation of a viable zygote.”); 1 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
MEDICINE 254 (John Walton et al. eds., 1986) (“Conception. The fertilization 
of an ovum by a spermatozoon and the implantation of the resulting zygote.”); 
DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 365 (W.B. Saunders Co., 
28th ed. 1994) (“Conception 1. The onset of pregnancy, marked by 
implantation of the blastocyst in the endometrium, the formation of a visible 
zygote.”). 
 20 Teresa Menart, The Challenge of Contraception for Those Who Respect 
Life, http://www.omsoul.com/pamview.php?idnum=105 (last visited Mar. 17, 
2007); Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2006, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/07/magazine/07contraception. 
html?ei=5070&en=e19e857aa8b70359&ex=1173758400&pagewanted=all.; 
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Therefore, depending on the definition of pregnancy, these types 
of statutes may allow pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control 
prescriptions. 
Other conscientious objection laws clearly apply to birth 
control but do not necessarily apply to pharmacists.21 This 
category of conscientious objection laws permits medical personnel 
to conscientiously object to birth control.  For example, Maine’s 
and Tennessee’s statutes apply to private physicians, institutions, 
and their staffs.22 Any pharmacist who works for a private 
physician or institution would enjoy the benefit of the laws.  
Similarly, West Virginia’s statute applies only to state employees 
and allows these pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control 
prescriptions.23 
Finally, five states have conscientious objection laws that 
clearly apply to both birth control and pharmacists.24  For 
example, Arkansas’ conscientious objection law, ironically a 
provision of a statute ensuring access to contraception,25 upholds 
                                                
ChristianAnswers.net, Can Birth Control Pills Kill Unborn Babies, 
http://www.christiananswers.net/q-eden/edn-bcpill.html (last visited Mar. 17, 
2007); see infra Part III.A. 
21 COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-207 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-102 
(2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/4 (2005); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225 
(2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104 (2005); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-4 
(2006). 
22 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-
34-104(5) (2005) (“No private institution or physician, nor any agent or 
employee of such institution or physician, shall be prohibited from refusing to 
provide contraceptive procedures, supplies, and information when such refusal is 
based upon religious or conscientious objection, and no such institution, 
employee, agent, or physician shall be held liable for such refusal.”). 
23 W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-4 (2006). West Virginia’s statute says in part: 
“Any employee of the State of West Virginia or any of its agencies or political 
subdivisions, including, but not limited to, local health or welfare agencies, 
may refuse to accept the duty of offering family planning services to the extent 
that such duty is contrary to his personal religious beliefs.” Id. 
24 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-304 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 381.0051 (2006); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
48.43.065 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 (2006). 
25 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-304 (2006). 
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pharmacists’ rights to object: “Nothing in this subchapter shall 
prohibit a physician, pharmacist, or any other authorized 
paramedical personnel from refusing to furnish any contraceptive 
procedures, supplies, or information.”26 
Another clear, though more complex, statute is found in South 
Dakota’s conscientious objection law. This law provides: 
No pharmacist may be required to dispense medication 
if there is reason to believe that the medication would be 
used to: 
  (1) Cause an abortion; or 
 (2) Destroy an unborn child as defined in subdivision 
22-1-2(50A); or 
  (3) Cause the death of any person by means of an 
assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing. 
No such refusal to dispense medication pursuant to this 
section may be the basis for any claim for damages 
against the pharmacist or the pharmacy of the 
pharmacist or the basis for any disciplinary, 
recriminatory, or discriminatory action against the 
pharmacist.27 
Subsequent provisions of South Dakota’s laws define “unborn 
child” as “an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from 
fertilization until live birth.”28  Because it has been maintained that 
the birth control pill can be used to prevent implantation,29 the 
statute clearly permits pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control 
prescriptions. 
                                                
26 Id. 
27 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006). 
28 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A) (2006). 
29 Marian Block, & Marvin C. Rulin, Managing Patients on Oral 
Contraceptives, 32 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 154, 154–55 (1985); Jennifer 
Johnsen, The Pill, (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/birth-
control-pregnancy/birth-control/the-pill.htm; Ortho Women’s Health and 
Urology, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.thepill.com/html/ppil/faq.jsp 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2007). 
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND 
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION CLAUSE 
This section explores the relationship between the 
Establishment Clause and conscientious objection statutes and the 
extent to which the Establishment Clause applies to such statutes. 
This section also provides a useful overview of Establishment 
Clause Supreme Court case law. Whether these conscientious 
objection clauses violate the Establishment Clause is particularly 
important because pharmacists often refuse to fill birth control 
prescriptions for religious reasons.30  Accordingly, conscientious 
objector clauses violate the requirement of the separation of church 
and state.  
A. A History of  Supreme Court Establishment Clause Case 
Law 
There are two clauses in the First Amendment related to the 
practice of religion: (1) the Establishment Clause and (2) the Free 
Exercise of Religion Clause.31 It is commonly recognized that the 
Establishment Clause is intended to prevent the Federal or State 
governments from establishing an official church or religion.32  The 
                                                
30 See Cantor & Baum, supra note 1; Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the 
Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy Implications of Refusal Clauses for 
Pharmacists, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 469, 470–72 (2006); Jed Miller, The 
Unconscionability of Conscience Clauses: Pharmacists’ Consciences and 
Women’s Access to Contraception, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 237, 237–39 (2006). 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 32 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000); 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 219 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839, 842 (1995); Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 587, 599 (1992); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 
15, 20 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 672, 673, 678 (1984); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 
(1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968); Sch. Dist. of 
Abington, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215–16 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421, 429–430 (1962); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441–42 
(1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952); Illinois ex Rel. 
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No.71, Champaign, Ill., 333 U.S. 
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Free Exercise of Religion Clause is intended to protect individuals’ 
rights to worship, provided individuals act within certain 
restrictions such as the practice of polygamy33 or the use of peyote 
for religious purposes.34  Notably, supporters of conscientious 
objector laws contend the Establishment Clause protects 
pharmacists’ right to object.35 This article focuses upon the 
Establishment Clause and the implications of Establishment Clause 
case law regarding the question of statutes, instead of focusing on 
the Free Exercise of Religion Clause. 
In 1943, the Supreme Court decided the watershed case 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania.36 Around the turn of the century, the 
city of Jeannette, Pennsylvania passed a law requiring that anyone 
canvassing or soliciting goods or orders for goods must first obtain 
a license from the government at a fee based upon the requested 
duration of the solicitation.37 Without obtaining a license, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses went door-to-door in Jeannette encouraging 
people to “purchase”38 religious books and pamphlets.39 None of 
                                                
203, 212 (1948); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 
14–15 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878); DANIEL 
DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN 
CHURCH AND STATE 62, 66–67, 125–26 (2003). 
33 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145 (upholding a federal law making polygamy 
illegal, despite a legal challenge from a Mormon who claimed it was his 
religious duty to practice polygamy). 
34 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (arguing laws 
banning the use of peyote for any reason, religious or otherwise, do not 
unconstitutionally restrict one’s right to the free exercise of religion). 
35 See, e.g., Tony J. Kriesel, Pharmacists and the “Morning-After Pill”: 
Creating Room for Conscience Behind the Counter, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 337 (2005); Courtney Miller, Reflections on Protecting Conscience for 
Health Care Providers: A Call for More Inclusive Statutory Protection in Light 
of Constitutional Considerations, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOCIAL JUSTICE 327 
(2006); Jessica J. Nelson, Freedom of Choice for Everyone: The Need for 
Conscience Clause Legislation for Pharmacists, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 139 
(2005). 
36 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
37 Id. at 106. 
38 The word “purchase” in addition to the words “sales” and 
“contributions” was in quotes in the original opinion by Justice Douglas 
(belying the Court’s ultimate opinion), and thus the use of quotes is maintained 
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them had obtained the license, though they had “sold” the 
materials.40 A group of them were convicted and fined for violating 
the ordinance, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the 
ruling.41  The Jehovah’s Witnesses argued that their conviction 
under the ordinance “deprived them of the freedom of speech, 
press, and religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.”42  
Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to hear their 
appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari to hear the case.43 
The Supreme Court struck down the statute, holding that the 
law violated the appellants’ right to practice their religion.44  Not 
only did Murdock unequivocally hold that the Establishment 
Clause protections of the First Amendment apply directly to the 
states,45 it also held that a law not specifically directed at religious 
organizations could still violate the First Amendment’s protections 
of religion.46  Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas reasoned that 
by evangelizing door-to-door, the Jehovah’s Witnesses were 
                                                
here. 
39 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 107. 
43 Id. The Court details a more robust version of the background events to 
the case. See generally id. at 106–07. 
44 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116–17 (1943). 
45 Id. at 108. Despite this discussion in Murdock, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296 (1940), which precedes Murdock by three years, appears to be the 
first case in which the Supreme Court ruled that the 14th Amendment applies 
the 1st Amendment to the states. Id. at 303 (“The fundamental concept of 
liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth Amendment] embraces the liberties 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”) (footnote omitted). The fact pattern in 
Cantwell is similar to Murdock; however, the Establishment Clause discussion 
in Murdock is more robust for the purposes of this article. Cantwell, like 
Murdock, involves Jehovah’s Witnesses who went door-to-door with a record 
player spreading their religious message and selling religious books or 
collecting donations. Id. at 301. The Connecticut statute under which the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses were charged is substantially similar to the one at issue in 
Murdock. The court overturned the statute in Cantwell, as in Murdock. Id. at 
301–02, 310–11. 
46 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115–17. 
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engaging in a religious practice akin to going to church for other 
religious groups.47 Although the Court recognized that state 
governments may constitutionally enforce financial regulations 
against religious organizations, the Court held that Jehovah’s 
Witnesses presented a special case given their specific beliefs and 
thus deserved special protection in the present case.48 The Court 
further explained that to tax Jehovah’s Witnesses for their door-to-
door solicitations would be akin to either taxing them for the right 
to worship or taxing a Minister for the right to preach to his or her 
congregation.49 
The Court further elaborated on the meaning of separation of 
church and state in Everson v. Board of Education of the Township 
of Ewing.50 The issue in Everson was whether a state could 
reimburse parents for public transportation used to carry children 
to school, regardless of whether the children attended public or 
Catholic school.51 A taxpayer sued arguing that the reimbursement 
to the parents of Catholic school52 kids constituted an 
impermissible establishment of religion under the First 
Amendment.53 The Supreme Court of New Jersey struck down the 
law as unconstitutional, but the Court of Errors reversed.54 
Ultimately the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of 
Errors opinion, ruling that the law was enforceable as written.55 
Justice Black, writing the majority opinion, reasoned that 
                                                
47 Id. at 108–09. 
48 Id. at 112. According to Justice Douglas, the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
represent a special case because they are a religious group that is being held 
exempt from a specific financial regulation due to their religious beliefs regarding 
one’s religious duty to engage in “missionary evangelism.” Id. Not all religions 
are exempt from financial regulations, just the Jehovah’s Witnesses with respect 
to what had amounted to a tax on their ability to perform their religious duties. 
Id. The specific theological beliefs, combined with the impact of the tax, created 
the special case for Jehovah’s Witnesses. Id. 
49 Id. at 113–14. 
50 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 3. 
53 Id. at 3–4. 
54 Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 44 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1945). 
55 Everson, 330 U.S. at 17–18. 
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although “[t]he ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First 
Amendment . . . [prohibits] the Federal Government [from 
setting] . . . up a church . . . [, it cannot] pass laws which aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”56 In 
other words, government legislation and policies must remain 
neutral regarding religion. Nevertheless, in limiting this holding, 
Black seemed to make the argument that legislation which has a 
“secular purpose” can be justified, apart from any effect it has on 
religion.57  Hence, in Everson, because the purpose of the law was 
to ensure the safe transportation of children to school and had 
nothing to do with supporting the Catholic Church, it constituted a 
valid secular state concern regarding the public welfare.58 
The Supreme Court further strengthened the line between 
church and state in 1948 with its decision in Illinois Ex Rel. 
McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No. 71.59 The 
plaintiffs in McCollum were a taxpayer and mother of a student 
whose school permitted children, with their parents’ permission, to 
attend religious classes during the school day and on school 
property.60 The Court struck down the law as violating both 
religious clauses of the First Amendment61 and explained the 
connection between the state and religion was too close.62 The 
Court warned that religious institutions and the state are best 
separated and that states could not “utilize [their] public school 
system[s] to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the 
dissemination of their doctrines and ideals . . . .”63 The Court 
further reasoned that the law lacked a legitimate government 
purpose as justification for the practice in question.64 McCollum 
serves to emphasize the Court’s disapproval of laws that allow 
state power to aid a religious sect in promoting its message. 
                                                
56 Id. at 15. 
57 Id. at 18. 
58 Id. 
59 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
60 Id. at 205. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 212. 
63 Id. at 211. 
64 Id. 
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The Court limited the scope of the First Amendment four years 
later in Zorach v. Clauson.65 Despite the consideration of a similar 
statute as was at issue in McCollum, the Court upheld the statute 
in Zorach because the religious instruction, though scheduled 
during school hours, occurred outside of school property.66 Justice 
Douglas admitted that although the mere allowance of religious 
instruction during school hours did not amount to a constitutional 
violation, “[g]overnment may not finance religious groups nor 
undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian 
education nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion 
on any person.”67 While differentiating Zorach from McCollum and 
allowing the religious instruction in Zorach, the Court reaffirmed 
its disapproval of laws allowing state power to be used to aid 
religious instruction or the spreading of a specific religion’s beliefs. 
In 1961, the Court examined the validity of the Sunday Blue 
Law—a statute prohibiting the sale of goods on Sunday.68 The 
Court upheld the law and ruled that secular purposes—the 
furtherance of public health and economics—could justify such 
statutes.69 In addition, the Court noted that the Blue Laws had no 
coercive effect upon people to go to church and be religious, and 
thus the law did not constitute state promotion of religion.70 The 
                                                
65 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
66 Id. at 311–12, 314–15. 
67 Id. at 314. 
68 Id. at 422. 
69 Id. at 433–35. Chief Justice Warren gives examples of public health and 
well-being arguments as having been historically used to justify Blue Laws. 
Here the argument is that a day of rest is good for public health and it provides 
time that families can spend together, which is also good for public well-being. 
In addition, Warren recounts an economic justification given for Blue Laws that 
claims a day of rest is good for workers as it allows them to recuperate from a 
week’s worth of work, and thus makes them more productive when they do 
work. Clearly the pubic health and well-being argument and the economic 
argument go well beyond the original religious justifications offered for the Blue 
Laws. Id. 
70 Id. at 452. Here, Warren makes explicit reference to McCollum v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), discussed earlier in this 
section, as it is the only case in the then-scant Supreme Court jurisprudence 
finding a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In 
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Court cautiously noted, however, that Blue Laws could violate the 
Establishment Clause if they promoted, or were intended to 
promote, a particular religion or religious belief.71 
After years of a piecemeal approach to Establishment Clause 
analysis, the Court created its first test in School District of 
Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp.72 In explaining the 
test, the Court wrote: 
What are the purpose and the primary effect of the 
enactment?  If either is the advancement or inhibition of 
religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of 
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. 
That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the 
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative 
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion.73 
The focus of an Establishment Clause inquiry is the purpose and 
intent of the law. A statute could only withstand the inquiry if it 
has a secular legislative purpose and an underlying nonreligious 
intent.74  The Court then used the test to strike down two state 
statutes. The first statute required public school students to start 
school with a recitation from the Bible and a Christian prayer.75 
The other statute gave students the option to read from the Bible 
                                                
McCollum, the Court concluded that schools were being used as a governmental 
sanction of a specific religion and, more importantly, that the sanction provided 
coercive force toward pushing specific religious beliefs upon children. Unlike 
McCollum, Warren argues, McGowan had no coercive force in the Blue Laws. 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 452 (1952). 
71 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 453. 
72 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. Recall the discussion of Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of 
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), earlier in this section. At issue in Everson was the 
public support for busing children to public and parochial schools. The Court 
ruled that the busing had the secular purpose of transporting children safely to 
school and did not advance the interest of the Catholic faith by helping to 
transport children to Catholic schools. In this respect, Clark’s test comports 
with the ruling in Everson and formalizes the Court’s logic into its first attempt 
at a clearly delineated Establishment Clause test. 
75 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 206. 
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or recite the prayer.76 
Building upon the Schempp test, the Court in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman77 created the modern-day Establishment Clause 
standard.78 First, the court cited three purposes behind the 
Establishment Clause: prevention of (1) state sponsorship of 
religion; (2) state financial support of religion; and (3) active state 
involvement in religious activity.79 Next, the court established its 
three-pronged test: “First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be 
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute 
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’”80 
The third part of the test is most central to the analysis. 
According to Lemon, to determine excessive entanglement, courts 
must “examine the character and purposes of the institutions that 
are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the 
resulting relationship between the government and the religious 
authority.”81 The court further elaborated that if a program required 
a large amount of government oversight or regulation of a religious 
body to maintain the separation of church and state, the oversight 
would be evidence of excessive entanglement; thus, the law would 
be unconstitutional pursuant to the first amendment.82 
                                                
76 Id. at 203. 
77 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
78 See John Gay, Bowen v. Kendrick: Establishing a New Relationship 
Between Church and State, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 953 (1989); see also Matthew 
D. Donovan, Religion, Neutrality, and the Public School Curriculum: Equal 
Treatment or Separation?, 43 CATH. LAW. 187 (2004). 
79 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
80 Id. at 612–13. (internal citations omitted) 
81 Id. at 615. 
82 Id. at 620. It is important to notice that Burger’s stricture clearly limits 
states’ allowance of religious figures into public schools. However, the rule also 
limits excessive government regulation of religious schools. This is not to say 
that the government cannot place certain restrictions on parochial schools, rather 
it is to say that only the most basic restrictions can be placed on parochial 
schools. Apart from these basic restrictions, these religiously based schools have 
plenty of leeway to make their own governing rules. In this sense, although 
Lemon in some ways limits religious teachings (in public schools), it also 
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One example of a subsequent application of the Lemon test is 
Wallace v. Jaffree.83 Here, the Court struck down an Alabama law 
authorizing public school teachers to hold a one-minute period of 
silence for meditation or prayer and allowing teachers to lead 
willing children in prayer.84 The Court wrote: “A system which 
secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological 
causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to 
foster such concepts.”85 In other words, the religion clauses of the 
First Amendment work both to protect religion as well as to 
protect those who choose not to follow a particular religion.86 The 
                                                
grants extra freedom to religious schools to govern their own institutions. 
83 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 51. Similarly, the Court stated, “[a]s is plain from its text, the 
First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with 
the individual’s freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in 
accordance with the dictates of his own conscience,” id. at 49, which further 
explains the Court’s take on governmental involvement with respect to religious 
issues or questions of conscience. 
86 In particular, the Wallace Court explained: 
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are 
complementary components of a broader concept of individual 
freedom of mind, so also the individual’s freedom to choose his 
own creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting 
the creed established by the majority. At one time it was thought 
that this right merely proscribed the preference of one Christian 
sect over another, but would not require equal respect for the 
conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-
Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism. But when the underlying 
principle has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court 
has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of 
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right 
to select any religious faith or none at all. This conclusion derives 
support not only from the interest in respecting the individual’s 
freedom of conscience, but also from the conviction that religious 
beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary 
choice by the faithful, and from recognition of the fact that the 
political interest in forestalling intolerance extends beyond 
intolerance among Christian sects—or even intolerance among 
“religions”—to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and the 
uncertain. 
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Court concluded that the state clearly intended to endorse 
religion,87 and given the law’s allowance for teachers to lead prayer, 
it constituted the promotion of a specific religion against the 
wishes of those who chose not to participate in the prayer.88  
Thus, the Court held that the Alabama law failed the first prong of 
the Lemon test because the law did not have a secular purpose. 
III. THE LEMON TEST AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
STATUTES: A FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE? 
This section evaluates whether conscientious objection laws 
that explicitly allow pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control 
prescriptions violate the Establishment Clause as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court in Lemon.89 The discussion applies the Lemon 
test to one of the most controversial of these statutes—that of 
South Dakota, outlined in Part I.90 As applied to the Lemon test, 
the South Dakota conscientious objection law, as well as analogous 
statutes, should be struck down because such laws lack a secular 
purpose.91 
Statutes which explicitly cite religion as permissible grounds for 
a pharmacist’s refusal deserve the most scrutiny under the 
Establishment Clause.92  The justification for an Establishment 
                                                
Id. at 52–54. 
87 Id. at 56–60. Indeed, the representative who introduced the bill said for 
the legislative record that it was his sole intent to bring back prayer in public 
schools. During its analysis, the Court determined the intent of the law was 
either to return prayer to public schools or the bill had no point at all, which 
was unlikely. Accordingly, the Court deemed the law to be unconstitutional. 
88 Id. at 56. 
89 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
90 South Dakota’s statute, like the other statutes in the fourth category of 
statutes discussed in Part I, explicitly permits pharmacists to refuse to fill a birth 
control prescription on the grounds that it violates the pharmacist’s religious 
beliefs. 
91 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); 
see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); 
Lemon, 403 U.S. 602. 
92 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (2006); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-
304 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2006); COLO. 
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Clause inquiry is less clear for less explicit statutes, such as that of 
South Dakota. Is this statute religious in nature, and therefore 
unconstitutional, or is it merely primarily used by religious 
                                                
REV. STAT.§ 25-6-207 (2005), COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-102 (2005); FLA. 
STAT. § 381.0051 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2006); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-612 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
311.800 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903 (2005); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2006); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.475 (2006); N.M. 
STAT. § 30-5-2 (2006); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485 (2006); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 435.225 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 68-34-104 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 18.2-75 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.065 (2006); W. VA. CODE 
§ 16-2B-4 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 253.09 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 
(2006). 
 Most of these 26 states provide multiple reasons for objection, one of which 
is a person’s religious beliefs (but not all 26 statutes necessarily apply to 
pharmacists and birth control, as was discussed supra Part II). However, 
Georgia’s and West Virginia’s statutes list religious objections as being the 
only grounds upon which pharmacists may object to the filling of a birth control 
prescription. These two statutes are blatantly unconstitutional in that they place 
a premium on religious belief over non-belief, and they do not allow for 
conscientious objection based on personal or moral grounds. See Everson, 330 
U.S. at 15 (stating “The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: . . . Neither can pass laws which aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”) (emphasis 
added); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 212 (quoting the plaintiff, in support, as 
saying the law in question in Schempp “violated [plaintiffs’, who are atheists,] 
rights ‘in that it threatens their religious liberty by placing a premium on belief 
as against non-belief and subjects their freedom of conscience to the rule of the 
majority . . . .’”); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 358–59 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (stating “If the exemption is to be given application, it 
must encompass the class of individuals it purports to exclude, those whose 
beliefs emanate from a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. The 
common denominator must be the intensity of moral conviction with which a 
belief is held. Common experience teaches that among ‘religious’ individuals 
some are weak and others strong adherents to tenets and this is no less true of 
individuals whose lives are guided by personal ethical considerations”) (citations 
omitted). Nonetheless, the focus of this section, and the article as a whole, are 
not these two outliers but rather the other conscientious objection clauses for 
pharmacists. Accordingly, this section will focus on these other statutes to 
determine their constitutionality. 
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objectors as justification for their actions? 
A. The South Dakota Law Implicates the Establishment Clause 
Before examining the law under the Lemon test, it must be 
demonstrated that the Establishment Clause applies.93 Essentially, 
there must be a religious aspect to the law.94  One indication that 
the South Dakota statute relies upon religious motivation is that 
the definition of unborn child used in the accompanying statute is 
inconsistent with the standard medical definitions for when 
pregnancy has begun. For example, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) defines pregnancy as beginning with 
implantation rather than fertilization.95 The American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ Committee on Ethics similarly 
defines pregnancy as beginning with implantation, not 
fertilization.96 Indeed, the Committee defines pregnancy as 
occurring in the implantation stage because the embryo at the time 
of fertilization through implantation lacks clear “biologic 
                                                
93 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602. The Lemon test is an Establishment Clause 
test; therefore, without first demonstrating that the conscientious objector laws 
invoke Establishment Clause legal claims, any application of the Lemon test 
would seem inappropriate. 
94 Id. 
95 See 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REPRODUCTION 986 (Ernst Knobil & Jimmy 
D. Neill eds., 1998) (explaining that “[f]ollowing implantation an orchestrated 
sequence of events occurs local to and distant from the fetoplacental unit leading 
to the altered physiological state of pregnancy.”). Based on the quotation given, 
in addition to the accompanying section of the cited source, pregnancy is 
understood to be a vague state consistent of a number of physiological changes 
that occur within the woman's body. Id. As the text explains, and as the quoted 
section implies, these physiological changes occur over a protracted period of 
time, but the important changes constituting pregnancy do not occur until after 
implantation. Id. The implications are that pregnancy need not begin with 
implantation, but it certainly cannot be said to medically begin before 
implantation. Id. 
96 Mary K. Collins, Conscience Clauses and Oral Contraceptives: 
Conscientious Objection or Calculated Obstruction?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 
37, 44, n. 82 (2006) (citing AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & 
GYNECOLOGISTS COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, PREEMBRYONIC RESEARCH: 
HISTORY, SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND, AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 1 (No. 
136, Apr. 1994)). 
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individuality necessary for a concrete potentiality to become a 
human person, even though it does possess a unique human 
genotype.”97  Nothing exists which amounts to a full human life at 
the time of implantation.98 
Departing from these definitions, South Dakota’s legislature 
defines “unborn child” as existing after fertilization rather than 
implantation.99 Instead of following the medical definition, South 
Dakota’s definition is consistent with the beliefs of a majority of 
Christian sects.100 More importantly, not only is the definition 
fairly characterized at Christian, but it is also contrary to Judaism’s 
and Islam’s beliefs about the use of contraception and the beginning 
of life.101 Given the overlap between the Christian definition of life 
                                                
97 Id. 
98 Given the similarity of definitions, one could argue the AMA agrees with 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ Committee on 
Ethics’ assessment, but the AMA has tried very hard not to make any definitive 
statements on such a controversial subject. 
99 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A) (2007). Technically, the South 
Dakota legislature chose not to use the medical definition of pregnancy, as the 
AMA and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists do not 
define “life.” The AMA offers up qualifications for the beginning of a pregnancy, 
but they do not explicitly tackle the more philosophical question of the moment 
that life begins. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REPRODUCTION, supra note 95. The 
South Dakota legislature, however, has defined life, and has explicitly linked the 
definition of life to fertilization. In light of the medical profession’s failure to 
recognize a pregnancy at the point of fertilization, let alone a life, it seems fair to 
say the South Dakota legislature has rejected the medical definition of life. Were 
there to be a medical definition of life, it clearly would not be fertilization as this 
is not even a medical pregnancy yet. 
100 See Collins, supra note 96 at, 44–45. Collins points out that the most 
obvious example of a Christian sect that is anti-contraception is the Catholic 
Church. Collins associates the Catholic belief that life begins when the egg is 
fertilized with the Christian definition of life (fertilization of the egg), although 
Catholics are not the only Christian sect to hold this belief. Protestants also 
have a long tradition of opposing “unnatural” means of contraception. While 
some Protestant sects are now more open to birth control, this certainly does not 
apply to all Protestants. Presbyterians and Baptists, in particular, are still very 
much against the use of contraception. See also HAROLD SPEERT, OBSTETRICS 
AND GYNECOLOGY IN AMERICA, A HISTORY 445, 447 (1980). 
101 Collins, supra note 96, at 45–46. Collins argues that Orthodox Judaism 
allows the use of the Pill, although not surgical methods to prevent pregnancies. 
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and that used in the South Dakota statute, the statute furthers a 
religious purpose—the enforcement of Christian beliefs forbidding 
the use of birth control.102 Therefore, the South Dakota 
conscientious objection law violates the Establishment Clause. 
B. The Application of the Lemon Test 
Because the statute is religious in nature, it warrants an 
Establishment Clause analysis.103 Given the Court’s primary 
reliance upon the three-pronged Lemon test,104 the South Dakota 
conscientious objection law must satisfy the standard developed in 
Lemon.105 Finally, it deserves mention that a valid statute must 
meet all three prongs of the Lemon test.106 
1. The First Prong of the Lemon Test 
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that “the statute 
must have a secular legislative purpose . . . .”107 Stated otherwise, 
the statute must have a secular purpose that could justify using 
                                                
Id. at 44–45. Because the issue is the refusal to fill birth control prescriptions, 
the Pill is at issue, and the fact that the Orthodox Jewish idea of life and 
conception does not bar the use of the Pill further indicates that the definition 
used by South Dakota is not only non-medical, but it is not generic with respect 
to other religions. This religious bias is further emphasized by the fact that 
Islam “view[s] [an] embryo as potential, rather than an actual, life,” and thus 
affords it less consideration than a full life. Id. at 46. As such, there is nothing 
about the use of contraceptives, in particular the Pill, that would go against 
Islamic teachings, whereas some Christian sects do believe the use of 
contraceptives is against God’s will, or at the very least religious doctrine. See 
ISLAMIC COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ISLAM AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 116–17 
(1982). 
102 Or at the very least the purpose could fairly be assessed as allowing 
Christian pharmacists and those that agree with the Christian definition of life to 
impose their views on customers with valid birth control prescriptions by 
refusing to fill such prescriptions. 




107 Id. at 612. 
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what appears to be a Christian definition of life, instead of the 
medical definition.108 
The relevant inquiry with respect to the first prong of the 
Lemon test is whether there is a secular justification for the South 
Dakota legislature’s decision to link conception with fertilization 
and not with implantation.109 Justice Stevens offers some guidance 
regarding this relevant inquiry in his dissent110 in Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services.111 Justice Stevens’ analysis—the 
                                                
108 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431 (1961) (indicating that a 
law that is religious in origin is not necessarily unconstitutional if it has a 
secular purpose, such as the Maryland Blue Laws in question in McGowan). 
109 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
110 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989). Justice 
Stevens concurred in part (to the third holding, which was unanimous) and 
dissented in part (to holdings one and two, which were decided by a five to four 
margin). The discussion below reviews the plurality opinion and its holdings 
and discusses Stevens’ dissent. This article relies on Justice Stevens’ 
discussion in the dissent because the majority did not address the definition of 
life used in the Missouri state law. A plurality decided the case on other matters, 
but Justice Stevens, in his dissent, directly addressed the legality of the 
Missouri definition of life. Id. Given the similarity between the Missouri 
definition of life, and the definition at issue with the South Dakota statute (a 
Christian definition of life), it seems prudent to examine Justice Stevens’ 
comments. Justice Stevens is also the only Justice to comment on this similar 
definition. 
111 Id. at 490. Webster is an interesting case that, although not directly 
about the Establishment Clause, has important implications for Establishment 
Clause case law, and potentially for contraceptive use. At issue in Webster is a 
Missouri state law that amended the current state abortion laws. Id. at 499–500. 
The preamble to the state law defined life as beginning at conception (however, 
the state legislature inadvertently used the wrong term and actually meant 
“fertilization”), and stated that “unborn children” had explicit rights for health, 
life, and well-being. Id. at 501. The law went so far as to guarantee full 
Constitutional rights to all “unborn children.” Id. The law also required 
viability tests for any fetus believed to be at least 20 weeks in gestational age 
and prevented public employees and facilities from being used for any abortion 
except to save the life of the mother. Id. In addition, the law prohibited the use 
of public funding to advise or counsel a woman to have an abortion unless 
necessary to save her life. Id. Lower courts overturned the law as 
unconstitutional and held the definition of life in the preamble is an 
unconstitutional attempt to define life as a means to support the state’s new 
abortion laws. Id. at 503. 
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Court’s only discussion of whether the Missouri legislature’s 
preamble was constitutional—illustrates the pitfalls of such a 
definition and is therefore informative for the discussion at hand.112 
Moreover, Justice Stevens’ comments demonstrate awareness of 
prior precedent and the potential ramifications of the definition 
used in the Missouri preamble.113 
Justice Stevens’ also asserted that the legislature improperly 
defined “conception.”114 Like the South Dakota statute, the 
Missouri statute linked conception with fertilization, despite the 
medical definition associating conception with implantation.115 
Upon determining that the statute was enacted solely for religious 
purposes, Stevens concluded that no “secular basis for 
                                                
 The Supreme Court examined four portions of the Missouri law: (1) the 
preamble, (2) the ban on the use of public employees and facilities for non-life 
saving abortions, (3) the ban on public funding for non-life saving abortion 
counseling, and (4) the forced viability tests for all fetuses believed to be 20 
weeks in gestational age. Id. at 504. The majority refused to rule on the 
Constitutionality of the preamble on the grounds that the preamble merely 
expressed a value judgment made by the state for protecting life over abortion, 
and had no actual bearing upon the practice of abortion. Accordingly, the time 
was not “correct” to rule either way regarding the preamble, and the preamble is 
to be understood as stating a preference and is non-binding. Id. at 505–07. 
112 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 563–72. 
115 See MILLER & BRACKMAN KEANE, supra note 19 and accompanying 
text. Webster, 492 U.S. at 563. Missouri’s use of fertilization as the beginning 
of life is relevant to the discussion of state conscientious objector laws because 
South Dakota’s definition of “unborn child,” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-
2(50A) (2006), implicitly uses the same definition of life beginning at 
fertilization. Accordingly, Justice Stevens’ assessment of the Missouri statute at 
issue in Webster would thus also apply to South Dakota’s conscientious 
objection statute and its definition of an “unborn child.” It is important to 
realize that Justice Stevens’ words, although written in a dissenting opinion, are 
part of a dissent because he took the Missouri statute on its face and actually 
engaged in the evaluation of the preamble that the rest of the Court refused to do 
at the time of Webster. Accordingly, the Court has not ruled against Stevens’ 
interpretation of the preamble; it merely decided not to rule at the time of 
Webster, which renders Stevens the only member of the Supreme Court to 
directly address the constitutionality of the Missouri preamble. 
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differentiating between contraceptive procedures that are effective 
immediately before and those that are effective immediately after 
fertilization” exists.116 Hence, Stevens found that the law failed the 
first prong of the Lemon test and deemed it unconstitutional. In 
finding a violation of the Establishment Clause, Stevens made it 
clear that this violation resulted not from the overlap of a legal and 
religious definition, but rather from the lack of a secular purpose to 
justify the state’s use of one religion’s definition of life.117 
Based on Steven’s assessment of the Missouri preamble, the 
South Dakota statute also has no secular purpose for allowing 
pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions based on a 
Christian definition of life.118 Since Stevens concluded that there 
could be no secular purpose that would justify protecting a 
fertilized egg as opposed to an implanted fertilized egg—
distinctions which adhere to the Christian, rather than secular, 
medical definition—in the Missouri statute, there must be no 
secular purpose for the similarly worded South Dakota statute.119 
                                                
116 Webster, 492 U.S. at 566. 
117 Id. 
118 Recall that the South Dakota statute does not permit refusals for 
personal, religious, or moral reasons, but rather limits the statutorily 
permissible reasons to fill a prescription, including one for birth control, because 
it will result in the death of an “unborn child,” the definition of which is one 
directly in line with mainstream Christian theology. Therefore, the state has 
codified a religious definition of life without a valid secular purpose. 
119 The South Dakota statutory definition of “unborn child” is: “an 
individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live 
birth,” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A)(2006). For purposes of comparison, 
Missouri’s preamble states, in part, “(1) The life of each human being begins at 
conception; … As used in this section, the term ‘unborn children’ or ‘unborn 
child’ shall include all unborn child or children or the offspring of human beings 
from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological 
development.” MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1)–1.205.3 (2006). As can be seen, 
both the South Dakota and Missouri definitions employ remarkably similar 
language. One noticeable difference is that South Dakota uses “fertilization” 
whereas Missouri uses “conception.” However, the Missouri statute defines 
“conception” as “the fertilization of the ovum of a female by a sperm of a male,” 
MO. REV. STAT. § 188.015(3) (2006). As Justice Stevens points out, the 
Missouri statute improperly uses the medical term “conception,” which 
typically means implantation of a fertilized ovum, where what the Missouri 
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Without a valid secular purpose, the South Dakota law cannot pass 
the first prong of the Lemon test.120 
2. The Second Prong of the Lemon Test 
Although failing to satisfy even one prong of the test renders 
the law unconstitutional, an evaluation of each prong is valuable.  
The second prong of the Lemon test requires that the statute’s 
“principal or primary effect . . . be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion . . . .”121  That is, the law must be neutral with 
regards to religion and neither help nor harm one particular 
religion.122 
Establishment Clause case law has elaborated on the meaning of 
“advances” or “inhibits.” In Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court found 
that one necessary inquiry for determining whether government 
“advances” or “inhibits” religion is “whether the government 
intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of 
religion.”123 An extension of this definition includes direct 
monetary benefit, or harm, to a particular religion.124 Indeed, as the 
                                                
statute defines is the medical definition of fertilization, the term used in the 
South Dakota statute. Webster, 492 U.S. at 563 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Accordingly, South Dakota and Missouri use statutes that are almost identical 
in language. 
 While Stevens’ dissent is not controlling, his opinion is the only one 
rendered by the Court with regard to the issue of statutory definition of life that 
is clearly favoring Christianity over all other religions. In that Stevens’ dissent 
is consistent with current Supreme Court Establishment Clause precedent, the 
specifics of his argument should be adopted by the Court as their official 
position with respect to religious definitions of life that do not, and cannot, have 
a secular purpose. 
120 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
121 Id. at 613. 
122 Id. 
123 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60–61 (1985) (quoting Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690–91 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
124 See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) 
(holding that “when confined exclusively to publications advancing the tenets of 
a religious faith,” an exemption from sales tax violates the Establishment 
Clause, which prohibits the government from directly subsidizing religious 
messages while excluding secular publications from the same subsidy); Lemon, 
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Court stated in Zorach v. Clauson, “[g]overnment may not finance 
religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend 
secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force 
one or some religion on any person.”125 Last, Engel v. Vitale held 
that although religious coercion would fit this definition, 
government action need not be coercive to provide a harm or 
benefit.126 
In light of this case law, it is clear that the South Dakota statute 
implicitly benefits and advances Christianity by legally applying a 
Christian conception of life, thereby giving the arm of government 
to pharmacists who may force submission to their beliefs by 
refusing to fill one’s birth control prescription.127  By using a 
                                                
403 U.S. at 606–07 (invalidating state salary subsidies to teachers of secular 
subjects at church-related educational institutions); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. 
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948) (holding that privately employed 
religious teachers who teach religion in public schools during school hours 
violates the Establishment Clause, in part, because the religions are benefiting 
from the expenditure of state money). 
125 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (emphasis added). 
126 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
127 By allowing pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions in 
accordance with a legal definition that is consistent with one religion, but does 
not have a valid secular purpose, the state is acting in such a way as to lend 
support for one religion. Even if the state did not intend to support Christianity 
with its definition of life, this fact does not negate the reality that those who are 
Christian pharmacists now have the “right” to refuse to give people medication 
for which they have prescriptions; whereas non-Christians with other religious 
beliefs regarding life have no equivalent right to impose their beliefs on others. 
This scenario results in dissimilar treatment of various religions. To point out 
the unequal treatment of religions is not to say other religions deserve the same 
rights, but rather illustrates that the South Dakota government is not treating 
religions equally, and is in effect supporting one religion (Christianity) over all 
others. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 
(1947) (stating that “[t]he ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can 
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another.”) (emphasis added); see also Zorach v. 
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (stating that the “[g]overnment may not 
finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and 
sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on 
any person” (emphasis added)); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433 (1962) 
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Christian definition of life, South Dakota allows pharmacists to use 
the Christian definition to refuse services, namely filling birth 
control prescriptions, to customers. By using the legislative 
process to promote the Christian definition,128 and to protect 
pharmacists’ ability to enforce their beliefs onto others, the state is 
directly supporting the Christian faith through advocacy and 
support for a theological belief.  Therefore, the South Dakota 
statute unconstitutionally privileges one religion and fails the 
second prong of the Lemon test.129 
                                                
(equating the codification of religious principles to the religious persecution the 
Framers specifically tried to avoid when drafting the Constitution, Bill of 
Rights, and the law under both of these documents); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38, 51–55 (1985) (articulating the Court’s position that in order to 
preserve the right to free expression and freedom of conscience, the state cannot 
endeavor to enforce any religion’s beliefs by means of state power, as to do so 
robs all of their liberties, complicates politics, and sullies religious beliefs). 
This forced compliance might not be as prevalent in a large city where women 
have numerous pharmacies in a reasonably close proximity, but these options 
are not always available. Indeed, within the context of one-pharmacy and one-
pharmacist towns, the refusal to fill a woman’s prescription for birth control is 
tantamount to enforcing this subtle theocracy unless the woman has the ability 
to travel to the next pharmacy that will fill her prescription. See Karissa Eide, 
Can a Pharmacist Refuse to Fill Birth Control Prescriptions on Moral or 
Religious Grounds, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 121, 121–22 (2005); Holly Teliska, 
Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Undermine the Basic 
Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 229, 231 (2005); Collins, supra note 96, at 37. 
128 See Collins, supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
129 While the first prong of the Lemon test does not clearly apply to the 
states, other than South Dakota, that have conscientious objector statutes which 
clearly apply to pharmacists and birth control, the second prong is more 
applicable. Part of an analysis under the second prong of the Lemon test involves 
discussion of Zorach, 343 U.S. 306. Under Zorach, if a state institution, such 
as the legislature, tries to “use secular institutions to force one or some religion 
on any person,” then the act, in this case a law, is unconstitutional. Id. at 314. 
By allowing pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions based on 
religious reasons, Arkansas, ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-304 (2006), Florida, 
FLA. STAT. § 381.0051 (2006), Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
48.43.065 (2006), and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 (2006), 
permit the state to bolster specific religious beliefs against and to the detriment 
of those persons who do not hold the same beliefs. 
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3. THE THIRD PRONG OF THE LEMON TEST 
The third prong of the Lemon test requires that “the statute . . . 
not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”130 
The Lemon Court explained that courts must “examine the 
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the 
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting 
relationship between the government and the religious 
authority.”131 Based on the explanation given in Lemon, an 
excessive government entanglement with religion arises when the 
state is actively involved in promoting a religious message, or when 
the state fails to distance itself from a religious message. For a 
“government entanglement with religion . . . [to be] excessive,” the 
state must take actions that are proactive in nature, such as lending 
the arm of the state in a manner that shows a relationship of 
support between the state and the religious message.132 
                                                
 The problem is exacerbated by the governmental regulation of prescription 
medications such as birth control and the illegality of obtaining prescription 
drugs from a non-pharmacist. Therefore, when states such as Arkansas, Florida, 
Washington, and Wyoming allow pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control 
prescriptions, and these states neither allow legal recourse against these 
pharmacists nor provide a clear alternative for obtaining the medication (other 
than hoping to find a pharmacist that will fill the prescription), the state has 
used state power to directly advance religion at the cost of others. Therefore, 
Arkansas, Florida, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming all have 
conscientious objection statutes that fail the second prong of the Lemon test and 
are thus unconstitutional. Whether Mississippi’s statute is constitutional is less 
clear because Mississippi does not explicitly identify religion as the grounds for 
why a pharmacist may refuse to fill birth control prescriptions. See MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 41 107-5 (2006). However, the statute lists one’s “conscience” as a 
reason for refusing to fill prescriptions. Id. One’s conscience may include one’s 
religious beliefs. Therefore, it is likely, but unclear, whether Mississippi’s 
statute would be unconstitutional under the second prong of the Lemon test. 
130 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). 
131 Id. at 615. 
132 Id. Compare Everson, 330 U.S. at 17–19 (upholding the New Jersey 
law because the state bussed all students and did nothing to lend state power or 
support to the religious message of the Catholic schools that also had their 
students’ families reimbursed for bussing) with Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 
489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989) (holding that a Texas law that exempted religious 
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First, the “character and purposes of the institutions that are 
benefited” by the South Dakota law are, at first glance, ambiguous.  
Clearly, pharmacists who refuse to fill birth control prescriptions 
benefit. Although pharmacists are not necessarily a religious 
institution, their actions work to benefit Christianity. More 
specifically, the pharmacists who take advantage of the law are 
presumably Christian.133 The conscientious objection law benefits 
the religion by providing pharmacists a legislatively supported 
mechanism for enforcing their religious beliefs onto others.  Second, 
the law directly and specifically benefits Christianity by adopting 
its views on the beginning of life. By forgoing use of the medical 
definition of when a pregnancy begins in favor of one that is 
consistent with Christian theological beliefs, the state is lending its 
power and support to determine that the Christian definition (and 
not the medical, Islamic, Jewish, or other secular construction) is 
“correct.” 
The “nature of the aid that the State provides” through the 
statute is also supportive of Christianity. Foremost, the statute 
offers legal protection to those pharmacists who refuse to fill a 
prescription based on their Christian beliefs.134 The state also 
                                                
publications from state sales tax functioned as the government’s showing 
preferential treatment for religion, as opposed to secular publications, and thus 
the regulation involved active state support for a religious message). 
133 See Collins, supra note 96 at 44–46; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 145–46 (1990); see also Donald Herbe, 
The Right to Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protection of a Pharmacist’s Right to 
Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and Emergency Contraception, 17 J.L. & 
HEALTH 77, 85–88 (2003); Marilyn Gardner, Pharmacists’ Moral Beliefs vs. 
Women’s Legal Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 26, 2004, at 11; 
Dennis Rambaud, Prescription Contraceptives and the Pharmacist’s Right to 
Refuse: Examining the Efficacy of Conscience Law, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y 
& ETHICS J. 195, 195–97 (2006); Teliska, supra note 7, at 235; Eide, supra 
note 7; Sarah Sturmon Dale, Can a Pharmacist Refuse to Dispense Birth 
Control?, TIME, June 7, 2004, at 22. 
134 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006). Arkansas, Florida, 
Mississippi, Washington, and Wyoming all also offer protection from criminal 
and civil liability for any pharmacist who refuses to fill a birth control 
prescription; therefore, every statute in this relevant grouping has the same 
potential problem with respect to the third prong of the Lemon test. ARK. 
CODE. ANN. § 20-16-304 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 381.0051 (2006); MISS. CODE 
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offers aid by endorsing the Christian view of life. As such, the law 
seems to lend significant state aid to the promotion of a Christian, 
as opposed to a secular, viewpoint and the furthering of a Christian 
message. 
Although case law also directs courts to consider any “resulting 
relationship between the government and the religious authority,” 
the South Dakota statute does not explicitly create a relationship 
between the state government and Christianity.135 Nevertheless, 
the absence of such a relationship does not render the South 
Dakota statute constitutional.136 South Dakota does not require a 
religious authority to enforce its codified definition of life, nor is it 
necessary for the state to discuss the conscientious objection law 
with religious leaders.137 It is not necessary for the state to 
maintain a relationship with a religious institution.138 Hence, while 
there does not appear to be an explicit relationship, such a 
relationship is not necessary to conclude the law violates the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.139 
Finally, in attempting to piece together the excessive 
entanglement test, courts must examine whether the state is 
actively involved in spreading a religious message or if the state 
failed to distance itself from such a message.140 First, by codifying 
a Christian definition of life and protecting pharmacists who refuse 
to fill prescriptions for religious reasons, South Dakota is actively 
working to spread a Christian message regarding in particular what 
defines life as well as what are “acceptable” sexual behaviors and 
choices.  By codifying the Christian definition of life, and then 
using state power to protect those who refuse to fill medications 
                                                
ANN. § 41-107-5 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.065 (2006); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 42-5-101 (2006). 
135 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006). 
136 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. 
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
137 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290. 
138 Id. 
139 See Wallace, 472 U.S. 38; Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. 1; Lee, 505 
U.S. 577; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290. 
140 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). 
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because of this definition, the government is actively promoting the 
tenets of Christianity.141 Accordingly, South Dakota has not 
distanced itself from the religious messages used by pharmacists, 
and the statute impermissibly entangles religion and government.  
Therefore, South Dakota’s conscientious objection law fails the 
third prong of the Lemon test and violates the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause. 
IV. BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN WITH THE STATE’S 
INTEREST IN PROTECTING PHARMACISTS’ RIGHTS 
Supporters of conscientious objection laws contend that 
pharmacists should have the right to decline to fill birth control 
prescriptions believed to violate the pharmacists’ religious 
beliefs.142  Nevertheless, the pharmacists’ right to object is in direct 
conflict with women’s constitutional right to privacy, including 
access to birth control.143 
Even though a statute need not completely prohibit the use or 
sale of contraceptives to constitute an unlawful infringement on a 
person’s right to privacy,144 states should work to strike the 
proper balance between the rights of women and pharmacists. In 
trying to strike such a balance where two parties’ rights are in 
conflict, states should minimize the interference with each of the 
conflicting parties’ rights as much as possible. 
Conscientious objection statutes impose a significant burden on 
a woman’s right to obtain birth control and emergency 
                                                
141 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
142 Cara Soloman, Druggists Want the Right to Say No to Certain 
Medications, Seattle Times, Mar. 11, 2006, at B1. 
143 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1998) (reaffirming 
the right); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (affirming the 
right and extending it to minors); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1967) 
(extending the right to non-married couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 348 
U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing the right to privacy and stating that it protected 
the right of married couples to obtain birth control).  
144 See Carey, 431 U.S. 678 (holding that a statute forbidding the 
distribution of contraceptives to persons over 16 except by licensed pharmacists 
was unconstitutional because it would unduly limit access to contraceptives). 
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contraceptives.  Once a woman, in consultation with her physician, 
has determined that she wishes to use prescription contraceptives, 
she has the legal right to have that prescription filled at a 
pharmacy. For women who live in large metropolitan areas, where 
there are often multiple pharmacies located within minutes of each 
other and which employ multiple pharmacists, conscientious 
objection laws may not have as serious an effect on this right. In 
many cases, there may be another pharmacist at the pharmacy that 
can fill her prescription, or she may be able to travel to another 
close located pharmacy. On the other hand, even women who live 
in large metropolitan areas are not immune. An urban woman may 
not have access to other pharmacies because her insurance plan 
limits her to certain establishments.145 Further, low-income women 
may endure substantial economic burdens if required to travel 
extensively to obtain their prescriptions from other pharmacies. 
The problem is much more serious for the many women who 
live in small towns and rural areas. Only 12 percent of pharmacists 
nationwide practice in rural areas,146 and rural areas have fewer 
pharmacists proportionally than urban areas.147 Also, fewer 
pharmacists choose to practice in rural areas.148 Given the limited 
number of pharmacies and pharmacists in rural areas, even a single 
objector may have serious consequences for women.149 Women 
may be forced to travel miles to find a pharmacist who would be 
willing to serve them. This problem is exacerbated in the context of 
                                                
145 Many insurance plans, for instance, provide greater coverage if you go to 
an “in-network” pharmacy. See, e.g. Military.com, Benefits, http://www. 
military.com/benefits/tricare/tricare-pharmacy/tricare-pharmacy-program (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2007) (highlighting the difference in purchasing prescriptions at 
in-network and non-network pharmacies and explaining that costs will not be 
covered to the same extent at non-network pharmacies). Many managed care 
insurance programs distinguish in-network and out-of-network pharmacies. 
146 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RURAL HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, THE 2006 REPORT TO THE SECRETARY: RURAL HEALTH AND 




149 For a greater discussion of the obstacles faced by rural women, see 
Teliska, supra note 7. 
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emergency contraception, which must be taken within seventy-two 
hours of intercourse and requires a prescription in most states.150 
Overall, the consequences are serious. One possible effect is 
unwanted pregnancies, and consequently, children being born to 
parents who have neither the emotional nor financial means to 
support them. In some cases, pharmacists may not only refuse to 
fill the prescription, but may very vocally refuse and lecture the 
woman, resulting in her humiliation and a breach of the 
confidentiality to which she is entitled should other customers be 
within earshot.151 In other instances, the prescriptions are for 
medical reasons unrelated to birth control, and the woman’s 
inability to obtain her prescription may lead to a worsening of the 
medical condition for which she received the prescription. 
Although the negative consequences of these statutes are grave, 
there is also an important interest in protecting a pharmacist’s right 
to follow his conscience and practice his profession in a way that 
does not conflict with his religious beliefs.152  Advocates of a 
pharmacist’s right of refusal argue that the state has an interest in 
protecting the pharmacist’s first amendment right to the free 
                                                
150 Jed Miller, The Unconscionability of Conscience Clauses: Pharmacists 
Consciences and Women’s Access to Contraception, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 237, 
246–47 (2006). 
151 Article VII of the Code of Ethics of the American Society of Consultant 
Pharmacists provides as follows: “The Consultant Pharmacist shall respect the 
confidentiality of all clinical records, professional notes, memoranda, reports and 
other records relating to any patient’s medical condition or medication therapy; 
and shall in no case disclose such information without proper legal 
authorization.” American Society of Consultant Pharmacists Code of Ethics, 
http://ethics.iit.edu/codes/coe/amer.soc.consultant.pharmacists.html (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2007). Similarly, this behavior would breach two separate articles 
within the Code of Ethics of the American Pharmacists’ Association: Article II 
provides that “a pharmacist promotes the good of every patient in a caring, 
compassionate, and confidential manner,” while Article III states that “A 
pharmacist respects the autonomy and dignity of each patient.” 
Pharmacists.com, Code of Ethics for Pharmacists, http://www.pharmacist. 
com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search1&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&
ContentID=2903 (last visited Aug. 30, 2007). 
152 Rob Stein, Pharmcists’ Rights at Front of New Debate, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 28, 2005, at A1. 
KUBASEK FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED .DOC 2/11/08  9:39 PM 
 CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION CLAUSES 261 
exercise of religion,153 including the refusal to engage in practices 
that would violate his fundamental religious beliefs. 
In Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon 
v. Smith, the United States Supreme Court stated that: 
The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, 
the right to believe and profess whatever religious 
doctrine one desires. Thus, the First Amendment 
obviously excludes all “governmental regulation of 
religious beliefs as such.” The government may not 
compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the 
expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, 
impose special disabilities on the basis of religious 
views or religious status, or lend its power to one or the 
other side in controversies over religious authority or 
dogma.154 
Consequently, supporters of conscientous objection laws contend 
the First Amendment demands pharmacists be able to decline to fill 
a prescription because to do otherwise would conflict with their 
religious belief that the prevention of conception is akin to taking a 
life.155 
Despite any concern for pharmacists’ right to object, the 
constitutional right to privacy and potential obstacles to obtaining 
birth control outweigh pharmacists’ interest in exercising their 
religion. As a result, reform must be generated that protects 
pharmacists’ rights only to the extent that it does not pose such 
impossible obstacles to access for women. The consequences faced 
by pharmacists in the absence of such extreme statutes as that of 
South Dakota may be easier accommodated and, indeed, may even 
be foreseeable. Such legislative reform would serve as a political 
compromise and would be consistent with “the position 
                                                
153 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law … prohibiting the 
free exercise [of religion] ….”). 
154 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110 
S. Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990) (internal citations omitted). 
155 The Associated Press, Board Questions Pharmacists’ Refusal to 
Disperse Birth-Control Pills, Oct. 13, 2004, http://www.firstamendmentcenter. 
org//news.aspx?id=14189.  
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incorporated in the Conscience Clause of the American Pharmacists 
Association’s Code of Ethics, which recognizes a pharmacist’s 
right to exercise conscientious refusal but the simultaneous need to 
ensure patient access to prescribed drugs.”156 Thus, in becoming a 
pharmacist, one should perhaps be prepared to ensure patients’ 
access to medications, even if it conflicts with one’s beliefs. 
No court has yet determined that following one’s conscience 
constitutes a compelling state interest. Rather, in Valley Hospital 
Association v. Mat Su Coalition for Choice,157 the Alaska State 
Supreme Court found that the “right of conscience” of individuals 
and institutions was not a compelling state interest under the 
Alaska constitution, and therefore did not supersede the rights of 
women to obtain a constitutionally protected abortion.158  
Other courts have explained that the right to practice one’s 
religious beliefs is not an absolute privilege.159  For example, courts 
have held that an employer is not obligated to accommodate the 
religion of an employee if the accommodation requires more than a 
de minimus burden on the employer.160  One example of a possible 
accommodation for pharmacists in absence of broad statutory 
protection of their objection rights would be to allow pharmacists 
to refuse to fill prescriptions for birth control or emergency 
contraception only when another pharmacist is on duty at the same 
pharmacy that will fill the prescription. This accommodation 
would seem to provide a means for a pharmacist to practice his 
profession in conformity with his religious beliefs while not 
                                                
156 Id. 
157 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). 
158 Id. at 971. 
159 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977); 
Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1982). This lack 
of an absolute right can also be inferred from the EEOC Guidelines, which, in 
explaining dealing with the problem of an employee who refuses to work during 
an employer’s normal workweek due to his religion, states that an employer has 
an obligation under the statute to accommodate the reasonable religious needs of 
employees where such accommodation can be made without serious 
inconvenience to the conduct of the business. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967). 
160 Id. 
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infringing on the privacy rights of women.161 While such a statute 
may limit the total number of pharmacies at which a pharmacist 
would be able to seek employment, this consequence is not so 
harsh in light of the fact that many religions have practices that 
limit their practitioners’ employment prospects162 Even in the 
absence of a protected right, pharmacists would still be allowed to 
voice their disapproval, seek jobs that do not require them to go 
against their religious beliefs, or to work at pharmacies that can 
accommodate their religious beliefs.163 
Furthermore, the Court ruled in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. 
Bullock,164 that a burden on a religion is not necessarily 
unconstitutional because a “state may justify a limitation on 
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an 
overriding governmental interest.”165 Logically, one overriding 
governmental interest would be the ability of women to obtain 
medication they have been prescribed by their doctors.  This 
governmental interest is especially applicable to birth control 
medication because such medication is prescribed for various 
medical conditions and does not only function as a contraceptive. 
The appropriate solution may depend on the context. 
Conscientious objection statutes must be either struck down as 
unconstitutional or at least reformed to accommodate a woman’s 
                                                
161 Of course, the preservation of the pharmacists’ rights are dependent upon 
his being able to find a pharmacy to work where he will be able to practice with 
another pharmacist who has no objection to filling all prescriptions. 
162 For example, if a person’s religion requires him to attend church 
services on Sunday, his employment prospects would be limited to employers 
that did not require him to work regularly at the time of his worship services. 
Alternatively, if one’s religion requires the wearing of certain items of clothing, 
there may be some jobs where the wearing of such religious garb would prevent 
employment, as in the case of Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1988), in 
which the Supreme Court ruled that the Air Force did not violate the religious 
freedom of a Jewish officer when a regulation prohibited him from wearing a 
yarmulke while in uniform. The court recognized a compelling need for 
uniformity in the military with the subordination of personal identities to the 
overall group mission. 
163 Eide, supra, note 7, at 145. 
164 489 U.S. 1, 19 (1989). 
165 Id., citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982). 
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rights to birth control. Appropriate reform requires a proper 
balance be struck: conscientious objection laws must be narrowly 
drawn so that women retain access to birth control medication, yet 
pharmacists should not necessarily be required to violate their own 
religion. Such reform requires many pharmacies to adopt policies 
which can accommodate their employers’ beliefs while still 
providing essential services to women who need birth control and 
emergency contraception. Whatever the compromise, limitations 
must be made. In the meantime, pharmacists must proceed to fill 
these necessary prescriptions for women. 
CONCLUSION 
The Alan Guttmacher Institute estimates the number of women 
using birth control pills in the United States at 11.6 million.166 The  
figure only includes birth control pills, however, and does not 
account for birth control injections, patches, diaphragms, or other 
control methods requiring a prescription from a doctor.  Thus, a 
significant number of women are likely to be adversely affected if 
these conscientious objection laws are upheld without limitation. 
Indeed, many of these statutes, certainly that of South Dakota, not 
only interfere with a woman’s constitutionally protected right to 
birth control, but also clearly violate the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution. Until legislatures strike a proper balance in 
protecting pharmacists’ rights and women’s rights, these laws must 
not be upheld and pharmacists must be required to fulfill their 
professional responsibilities. 
 
                                                
166 See Guttmacher Institute, Contraceptive Use, http://www. 
guttmacher.org./pubs/fb_contr_use.html (last visited June 17, 2006). 
